This is total bahloney on the Governor's part.
The U.S. Supreme Court has already upheld, repeatedly, that (a) the teacher's union (and all other unions) cannot use our dues for political purposes without our consent, (b) we can withdraw our consent at any time and thereby opt out of their using our dues for poltical purposes, and (c) if we opt out, the unions must provide a public accounting to prove they did not use the dues against out will for political purposes.
If you don't believe me, ask the U.S. Supreme Court. Here are their decisons on the matter:
1. The U.S. Supreme Court, in International Association of Machinists v. Street, [367 U.S. 740 (1961)] found that such expenditures fall outside of the scope of reasons which justified union shop agreements.
2. In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court in Railway Clerks v. Allen reaffirmed that, under Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, labor unions cannot, over an employee's objection, use exacted funds to support political activities which such employees oppose [373 U.S. 113, 118-19 (1963)].
3. In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, extended Street and Allen to encompass dissenting non-union public employees [431 U.S. 209(1977)] basing its decision, however, on constitutional grounds that were not at issue in the prior cases. While a labor organization can constitutionally expend funds for the expression of political and ideological views which are not germane to its collective-bargaining activities, it can only finance such expenditures from the dues of non dissenting employees [Id., 235-36]. Dissenting, non-union employees have a constitutional First Amendment right to prevent a labor union from using a proportionate share of their service fees for certain political and ideological activities unrelated to the union's collective-bargaining activities. [Id., 234. Cf., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1976) in which the Supreme Court held that contributions to organizations for the purpose of spreading a political message were protected by the First Amendment.]
4. In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, the Court was asked to determine the validity of a rebate scheme, in which a labor union collected dues from employees and used them for certain political and ideological activities, later paying a rebate to employees who dissented from the political and ideological use of such dues [466 U.S. 435 (1984)]. The Court noted that under the rebate scheme the union obtains an involuntary loan for those political and ideological activities to which the dissenting employees object [Id., 443]. Since
there were readily available acceptable alternatives to such union borrowing, such as advance reduction of dues and/or interest bearing accounts, the Court found that a union cannot be allowed to use the dissenting employees' funds even temporarily.
5. Two years later, in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson [475 U.S. 292 (1986)] the Supreme Court held that the constitutional requirements for the union's collection of agency fees from non-members would include: (1) an adequate explanation for the basis of the fee; (2) a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial arbitrator; and (3) the establishment of an escrow fund for the amounts reasonably in dispute while any challenges are pending.
In addition, the Congress has current proposals under consideration would mostly codify the Supreme Court's decisions in Street, Abood, Ellis, Chicago Teachers Union, Beck, and Lehnert. These decisions have interpreted the NLRA and the RLA as restricting the use of compulsory union dues by labor organizations, providing for the disclosure of union expenditures, and notifying employees of their right not to join a union as a condition of employment (the payment of agency dues or fees would be required). However, the various proposals tend to go beyond the Court's interpretations of the statutes. One major difference, which appears in several bills, is the provision that prohibits labor organizations from collecting any dues or fees not related to collective bargaining, contract adminstration, or grievance adjustment unless the employee has agreed, in writing, to pay such dues or fees.
[Sources and text above gleaned from The Use Of Union Dues For Political Purposes: A Legal Analysis, by John Contrubis and Margaret Mikyung Lee, American Law Division, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS; Number 97-618. http://countingcalifornia.cdlib.org/crs/ascii/97-618]
In short, repeated U.S. Supreme Court decisions have decisively demonstrated that CA Public Employee Union members and agency fee payers (a) can allow their union dues to be used for political purposes, (b) can opt out anytime at a later date if change their minds and do not want the union to use their dues for political purposes, and (c) must be clearly informed by the union of both (a) and (b) above.
So then what's the real purpose of Prop. 75? It sure isn't to provide union members with the right to keep unions from using our dues for purposes we disagree with, we've already had that right for decades.
Jarrod J. Williamson, Ph.D.
We sleep safely in our beds because rough men stand ready in the night to visit violence on those who would do us harm.
About the Author
Jarrod J. Williamson, Ph.D. earned his doctorate in Chemical Engineering from UCLA and currently works in the public school system in Southern Calfornia. His personal blog can be found at http://www.asphaltadventist.blogspot.com